Rolston, Holmes III
Cafaro, P., Sandler, R. (eds.) (2004): Environmental Virtue Ethics. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pages 61-78
Rolston warns against casting environmental virtue in too fundamental a role in environmental ethics. Although environmental virtue is an intrinsically good state, valuable to its possessor, and enables attunement to “the flow of nature,” we must not identify human virtue or excellence as the source of natural value. Natural entities do not derive their value from their relationship to human virtue und flourishing; nature and natural entities have value in themselves. Indeed, environmental virtue is only intelligibly as a responsiveness to the independent value of nature. After all, it is hard to gain much excellence of character from appreciating an otherwise worthless thing. The author finds environmental virtue ethics dangerous to the extent that its focus on human flourishing distracts us from the intrinsic value of natural entities that makes environmental virtue possible. Our deeper ethical achievement needs to focus on values as intrinsic achievement in wild nature. These virtues within us need to attend to values without us.